Games Contained in

Evolutionarily Stable Strategies

Strict Equilibrium

Hero

Coordination Games

Hotellings Game

Improper Braithwaite

Inspection Game

Classical Matrix Game

No Pure-Strategy Equilibria

Intersection of bounded

Tractable Pure-Strategy Equilibria

k-Bounded

Graphical Games

Tractable Pure-Strategy Equilibria

k-Bounded Neighbourhood

Graphical Games

Small Neighbourhood

k-Bounded Treewidth

Graphical Games

k-Bounded Hypertree-width

Tractable Pure-Strategy Equilibria

Linear Cournot Duopoly

Cournot Duopoly

Local-Effect Games

Compact Representation

Symmetric Games (strong sense)

Location Games

No pure-strategy Nash when N > 3

Strict Equilibrium

Majority Voting

Matching Pennies

Classical Matrix Game

Complete Opposition

Constant-Sum Games

Wednesday, May 26, 2004 Page 5 of 10
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